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RECENT CASE NOTES
take the further step of holding picketing activities accompanying a strike
for a closed shop enjoinable on the ground that such activities are designed
to force the employer to coerce his non-union employees (assuming they have
refused to join the union) to join such union against their will. Quaere
whether this is desirable?
S.C.
QUIETING EQUITABLE TITLE-BoUNnARIE.-A mother owned a lot on which
was situated two houses. After the marriage of plaintiff to her son, she
promised to give them one of the houses, described as "the little house
on the alley," if they would improve the property, pay the taxes,, and make
it their home. No deed for the property was ever made. Plaintiff and
her husband lived thereon for ten years, made permanent improvements, and
paid taxes on the lot. Subsequent to the death of the plaintiff's husband,
the mother deeded the entire lot to two other sons, who knew of plaintiff's
interests in the property. Plaintiff brought an action to quiet her equitable
title to that part of the lot on which the house was situated. Held, for the
plaintiff. Sweeney v. Sweeney (Ind. App., 1940), 25 N. E. (2d) 273.1
The case presents the problem as to the rights of one having a purely
equitable title to real estate to have such title quieted as against an outstanding
legal title. The plaintiff derives her equitable claim of title from a parol
promise of a gift of real estate. The authorities are agreed that, under such
facts, where possession is taken and valuable and permanent improvements
are made on the land by the promissee in reliance on the promise there is
sufficient change of position to give rise to an estoppel on the part of the
promissor, and make the promise enforceable. 2 The same facts have uniformly
been held to constitute sufficient part performance under an oral contract
to convey land to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. 3
Thus it is seen that as against the grantor there is a specificially enforceable
promise to convey land. And it has been held that such part performance in
reliance upon a promise to convey as will establish a right to specific per-
others to join its ranks. Therefore, the fact that lawful activities for that
purpose are being conducted by a union against an employer none of whose
employees is a present member of the union should not be a controlling factor
in holding such activities unlawful.
1 The mother, grantor, and her two sons, grantees of the legal title, were
joined in the suit as parties defendant. The mother disclaimed, and the
grantees defended.
2 POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3 ed., 1926), secs. 130, 131;
Horner v. McConnell (1901), 158 Ind. 280, 63 N. E. 472; Ault v. Miller
(1932), 203 Ind. 487, 181 N. E. 35; Starkey v. Starkey (1893), 136 Ind.
349, 36 N. E. 287; Burns v. Fox (1887), 113 Ind. 205, 14 N. E. 541; Horner
v. Clark (1901), 27 Ind. App. 6, 60 N. E. 732; Bevington v. Bevington
(1907), 133 Iowa 351, 110 N. W. 840, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 508. Cf. Froman v.
Froman (1859), 13 Ind. 317.
3 Horner v. McConnell (1901), 158 Ind. 280, 63 N. E. 472; Starkey v.
Starkey (1893), 136 Ind. 349, 36 N. E. 287; Burns v. Fox (1887), 113 Ind. 205,
14 N. E. 541; Cutsinger v. Ballard (1888), 115 Ind. 93, 17 N. E. 206; Osterhaus
v. Creviston (1916), 62 Ind. App. 382, 111 N. E. 634.
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formance also gives rise to an equitable title in the promisee.4  Quiet title
proceedings have been held proper in such situations.5
It is clear in the principal case that the defendant grantees are in no
better position than their grantor, having taken the legal title with full
knowledge of all the facts giving rise to equities in favor of the plaintiff.6
There remains the objection of indefiniteness in the promise, such that
the property, subject of the gift, was not definitely described, and thus unascer-
tainable. The oral promise was to make a gift of a part of a larger lot,
"the little house on the alley"; and there never was any division of the lot
as between the two houses situated thereon. The defendants contended that
because of indefiniteness in the promise it was impossible to determine just
how much of the lot should accompany the house in the gift, and that the
promise was thus unenforceable.
It has been held repeatedly that in the case of a deed or a contract to
convey land, the instrument or agreeemnt is void if the premises cannot
be definitely identified from the description contained therein. 7  But it
may be observed that the classical situation in which this objection of
indefiniteness arises is in the attempt to enforce or reform a written instru-
ment. In such cases the parol evidence rule makes it impossible to clarify
the indefinite promise, and it is unenforceable because the thing to be done
cannot be made certain.8 But the obstacle offered by this rule is not present
in the principal case, where an oral promise to convey land has become
enforceable by reason of part performance.
It has been said that where a promise is unenforceable for uncertainty,
performance of the consideration therefor by the other party does not make
it enforceable, but may give rise to quasi contractual obligation to pay the
fair value of what has been received.9 However, in a case like the one
4 Homer v. Clark (1901), 27 Ind. App. 6, 60 N. E. 732; Osterhaus v.
Creviston (1916), 62 Ind. App. 382, 111 N. E. 634-; Cutsinger v. Ballard
(1888), 115 Ind. 93, 17 N. E. 206. Cf. Johnson v. Pontius (1888), 118 Ind.
270, 20 N. E. 792.
5 Stanley v. Halliday (1891), 130 Ind. 464-, 30 N. E. 634-; Puterbaugh v.
Puterbaugh (1891), 131 Ind. 288, 30 N. E. 519. Cf. Grissom v. Moore (1885),
106 Ind. 296, 6 N. E. 629. Problems of pleading in suits to quiet equitable
title have arisen so frequently as to be conspicuous. In general, it is apparent
that a party must be careful to allege only an equitable title, and not legal
title, if he hopes to recover on proof of facts giving him equitable title. Sec
Coppock v. Austin (1904-), 34 Ind. App. 319, 72 N. E. 657; Stout v. McPheeters
(1882), 84- Ind. 585; Groves v. Marks (1869), 32 Ind. 319.
6 5 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY (Perm. Ed., 1940), sec. 2628; Mull v. Orme
(1879), 67 Ind. 95; Horner v. Clark (1901), 27 Ind. App. 6, 60 N. E. 732.
7 Preston v. Preston (1877), 95 U. S. 200, 24- L. Ed. 4-94-; Gigos v. Cochran
(1876), 54 Ind. 593; Peck v. Sims (1889), 120 Ind. 34-5, 22 N. E. 313; 66 C. J.,
sec. 72, p. 536. It is settled that in a complaint to quiet title there must be
a sufficiently definite description to identify the premises on which the title is
sought to be quieted, for the reason that otherwise there would be no definite
tract to which the decree could quiet title. See College Corner and Richmond
Gravel Road Co. v. Moss (1883), 92 Ind. 119; Jones v. Mount (1902), 30
Ind. App. 59, 63 N. E. 798.
8 McKELVEY ON EVIDENCE (4 ed., 1932), sec. 330, p. 488; Katz v. Daughtrey
(1930), 198 N. C. 393, 151 S. E. 879; Bissette v. Strickland (1926), 191 N. C.
260, 131 S. E. 655; Torr v. Torr (1863), 20 Ind. 118; Baldwin v. Kerlin
(1874), 46 Ind. 426; Miller v. Campbell (1875), 52 Ind. 125.
9 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed., 1931), sec. 49.
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under consideration, where compensation would be so clearly inadequate and
incapable of ascertainment, it is submitted that the courts should go the
whole distance in trying to find a way to meet the uncertainty and make the
promise enforceable.
In the principal case the uncertainty lies in the difficulty of affixing definite
boudaries to the land accompanying the house in the gift. Courts of equity
have claimed jurisdiction to ascertain boundaries of land where some equity
has arisen from the conduct or relation of the parties which, in justice to the
parties, demands that such jurisdiction be assumed.' 0 But the courts have been
reluctant about exercising jurisdiction in cases of this kind.11 The ordinary
situations where they have done so are cases of estoppel resulting from wrong-
ful confusion of boundaries or where there was an affirmative duty on one
to preserve boundaries.12 No case has been found in which the court was
called upon to fix the boundary of an inaccurately described parcel of a larger
tract of land. But it would seem that the facts of the principal case give
rise to sufficient equities in favor of the plaintiff to justify the court in con-
sidering the case to fall within the principles as defined by the courts allowing
determination of boundaries, so that it could quiet the plaintiff's title to a specific
tract of land.
Viewing the principal case in this manner, it would seem that the court
should be free to determine what was the intention of the promissor, evidenced
by the oral promise, and could allocate a reasonable portion of the lot to
accompany the gift of the house.1 3 It is submitted that the decision of the
principal case conforms to the demands of justice, and is not in conflict with
principle and authority. C.D.S.
102 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3 ed., 1939), sec. 652; Hays v. Bouchelle
(1906), 147 Ala. 212, 41 So. 518; Speer v. Crawter (Eng., 1817), 2 Mer.
410, 35 Eng. Rep. 997; Wake v. Conyers (Eng., 1759), 1 Eden 331, 28 Eng. Rep.
712; King v. Bingham (1892), 23 Or. 262, 31 N. W. 601, IS L. R. A. 361;
Wolcott v. Robbins (1857), 26 Conn. 236; Stuart's Heirs v. Coalter (1826),
4 Randolph (Va.) 74, 15 Am. Dec. 731.
11 See Annotation, 15 Am. Dec. 745.
122 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3 ed., 1939), sec. 652; Hays v. Bouchelle
(1906), 147 Ala. 212, 41 So. 518; Speer v. Crawter (Eng., 1817), 2 Mer. 410,
35 Eng. Rep. 997.
13 While actions to quiet title are of equitable origin, they exist in Indiana
by virtue of statute and are triable by jury. Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.),
Ch. 38, sec. 690, p. 240; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), sec. 3-1401. In the
principal case, boundary lines were arbitrarily designated by the plaintiff,
and these were used in drafting the complaint, so that relief was prayed as
to a definite tract of land. The court upheld this procedure under its charge
to the jury to the effect that the plaintiff had the burden of proving all facts
essential to the cause of action. Thus plaintiff was required to prove equitable
title to all of the land designated in the complaint. But see Monaghan v.
Mount (1905), 36 Ind. App. 188, 74 N. E. 759; Joseph v. Evens (1930), 388
Ill. 11, 170 N. E. 10.
